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Can it? On Expanding Institutional Theory by Disarming Critique 
 
A long silence. Suddenly: a flash, a rumble, a deluge. Does the Lok downpour 
revive institutional theory or swamp it? 
 
I am grateful to Professor Lok for his thoughtful, careful response to my 
intervention. (Actually, my debt is less to  “Professor Lok” than to “Jaco” [trans. 
‘he who supplants’], my erstwhile PhD student who I count as a friend – up  until 
now, at least!). I immediately apologize for this indiscrete deviation from the 
scholarly mystique of dispassionate impersonality. In a gesture of entente, 
requiring the loose talk of critical analysis to be restrained by the buttoned-up 
norms of institutional theory, I will avoid any further improper, overly 
transparent declarations.   
 
In many ways, Professor Lok’s  ‘Why (And How) Institutional Theory Can Be 
Critical’ expresses my core argument more cogently and forcefully than I did. He 
also gently chides me for claiming and perpetuating the distinctive, 
emancipatory monopoly of critical analysis that he associates with its ‘continued 
marginalization’ (all single quotes are taken from Lok, 2017 in press). I 
 
 I am urged to ‘resist’ and ‘traverse’ the fantasy of  ‘wholeness’ by contributing to 
‘creat[ing] the conditions of possibility for a more productive symbiotic 
relationship between (small ‘c’) critical institutional theory and  (big ‘C’) Critical 
[T]heory’.  My initial response is to say that I eagerly await the development of 
this ‘symbiotic relationship’ as I strain to discern signs of such a mutation and, 
































































relatedly, struggle to detect evidence of such ‘productiveness’ amongst 
exponents of the (North American) Hydra-like variant of institutional theory (IT) 
that is the focus of our exchange. In what follows, I offer a response to Professor 
Lok’s counter-proposition - that Institutional Theory (IT) can be critical. I 
broadly follow the sequence of his essay but adopt a streamlined format, and 
keeping references to a bare minimum, in order to make the most of the 
available space.  
 
1. Grand Challenges. Institutional theorists have indeed widened their range 
of concerns to address “grand challenges” - such as income inequality and 
poverty alleviation. However, many approaches, conservative as well as 
radical, examine such “grand” issues. Attentiveness is not a persuasive 
indicator of a commitment to critique and/or to facilitate a 
transformation of relations of domination, oppression, exploitation, etc. 
Recent interest in “grand challenges” by exponents of IT might be more 
plausibly attributed to other concerns - such as a desire to make IT less 
irrelevant and/or (even) more all-conquering. 
2. Conservative Pedigree. In common with critical forms of analysis (e.g. 
radical Weberian, neo-Marxist, post-structuralist, etc.), IT has diverse 
intellectual debts. That said, it is difficult, to identify any roots of IT that 
are nourished by anything other than a conservative or liberal intellectual 
tradition. To re-cycle Professor Lok’s well-chosen epithet, IT has a 
‘conservative pedigree’ (my emphasis) that, I suggest, frustrates or 
compromises any aspiration by well-intentioned efforts to make IT 
critical. To argue that the ‘onto-epistemological assumptions [of IT] are 
































































not necessarily an impediment’ to this venture, or that ‘a primary interest 
in the operation and effects of power itself is not a necessary 
precondition’ of IT becoming critical, is to underestimate the most 
daunting obstacle to such a development: the ethico-political commitment 
inscribed within IT’s ‘conservative pedigree’.  Urging a leopard to change 
its spots is unlikely to yield the desired mutation. 
3. Reflection. The tradition of IT places limited value upon reflection, 
including reflection upon its own development and limits. IT may show 
how ‘institutional processes constrain and naturalize the ways in which 
people come to know themselves in relation to organizational or societal 
practices’. But exponents of IT rarely turn this attention on their own 
practices. Consequently, there is little recognition of how, by sparing IT 
from such critique, its self-satisfaction and pervasiveness operates to 
maintain the established order. This conservative effect is both 
underpinned and justified, as Professor Lok notes, by a subscription - 
whether naive or cynical - to ‘a neo-positivist myth of impartial, detached, 
politically neutral science’ – a myth that IT ‘uncritically reproduces in its 
journals of choice’.   Perpetuating this myth may bestow some spurious, 
legitimacy upon IT. But it inhibits, if it does not entirely ‘preclude’, 
‘institutional theorists from becoming more critical in their work’.  
4. From Denaturalization to Domination. Denaturalization, which recalls the 
socially constructed nature of taken-for-granted realities, is a necessary 
yet insufficient condition of critical engagement. Where IT facilitates 
denaturalization, it may potentially enable ‘people in society [to] realize 
how they can unwittingly contribute to their own domination and 
































































oppression’. However, this (radical) interpretation of the significance of 
widely institutionalized (common)sense-making practices requires an 
additional element: the engagement of an alternative, critical form of 
analysis. As Professor Lok acknowledges, the notion of  “domination” or 
“oppression” is largely absent from the prospectus and vocabulary of IT, 
an absence that is not, I wager, accidental.  
5. Scientific Objectivity and Neutrality. IT’s investment in the neo-positivist 
myth of impartiality and detachment does not make it ‘well equipped’ to 
foster critical self-reflection on the scientistic ceremonials of its 
scholarship (ironically enough, given the focus on ceremony in a seminal 
text of IT). On occasion, there may be some ‘acknowledgement of the role 
of the researchers in the interpretation of the data, and the resulting 
historical, partial, and/or fallible nature of qualitative analysis’. But it 
seems to make little difference to how IT research is undertaken and 
presented. Where do we find the implications of the recognition of 
partiality or fallibility drawn out with regard to their ethico-political 
significance? There is, it seems, great resistance to confronting how ‘the 
authority…and the related academic status [of IT] appear to rest primarily 
on the legitimacy of the myth of scientific objectivity and neutrality’.  A 
plausible reason for such resistance is the risk of critical reflection 
‘nullifying the positive social impact institutional theorists increasingly 
desire to make though their work, because it could undermine its 
authority in, for example, the public policy realm by exposing how 
institutional theory is itself politically constructed’.  Here Professor Lok 
valuably debunks IT’s ‘neutrality’ or, better, points to how its ostensible 
































































‘objectivity’ is ‘politically constructed’ (emphasis added) but he stops 
short of explicating the features and implications of IT’s political 
construction. Instead, he seems to retreat into the IT closet from where he 
entertains the fantasy of ‘facilitate[ing] effective emancipatory 
interventions in society based on the authority and legitimacy [the] 
dominance [of IT] lends’ to such ‘emancipatory interventions’.  What 
conceivable kind of ‘emancipatory intervention’ can derive legitimacy 
from an association with IT? 
6. Smoke and Mirrors. It is argued that the Goffmanesque presentation of the 
IT-self as ‘value free’ and ‘politically neutral’ is a ‘stylistic choice’ that does 
not convey the personal preferences or political views of IT exponents 
but, rather, reflects the ‘dominance of the top American journals’.  
Somehow, there is a forgetting of how the sadomasochistic discipline 
imposed by ‘top journals’ is self-inflicted and enforced through 
labyrinthine processes of peer review.  Since it is the practitioners of IT 
that evaluate and regulate each other’s work, the enemy of transparency 
about values and politics lies within. More specifically, disingenuousness 
is embedded in ‘institutionalized academic careerism…[that] is 
responsible for the systemic effect of crowding out, and thus rendering 
mute, alternative approaches as soon as any particular theoretical 
approach becomes dominant’.  By jumping onto the capacious IT 
bandwagon , a comfortable career protected from any de-stabilizing 
contact with critical analysis.   
7. A Question of Commitment. My cursory and occasionally waspish 
responses (1-6) to Professor Lok’s essay may perhaps be read as a 
































































confirmation of the desire ‘to affirm the superiority of…more “genuine” 
and/or “radical” and/or “pure” critical commitments over those of 
institutional theorists’. I accept that my initial provocation (Willmott, 
2015) and my responses here are intended to highlight the difficulty, and 
indeed the improbability, of IT becoming critical. The scare quotes placed 
by Professor Lok around the terms “genuine” and “pure” in relation to 
‘critical commitments’ indicate, plausible enough, that all forms of 
theorizing are an impure amalgam (see point 2 above);  and also that they 
invariably affirm their “other”(s), even as the “other” is found wanting. In 
the case of critical analysis, “superiority” (the elevation of this/self over 
that/other) is, I suggest, associated with the depth of commitment to 
being critically self-reflective - such that critical analysis becomes “other” 
to itself, albeit in an incomplete and imperfect form.  As Professor Lok 
notes, being ‘open’ to the ‘other(s)’ requires the harboring of sufficient 
doubt and humility about one’s own standpoint - by, for example, giving 
‘the benefit of the doubt’ to others’ espoused interest in facilitating 
emancipatory change.  The difficulty, however, resides less in the 
intention, or interest, of the scholar, or even in the receptivity of “the 
target audience”. Instead, at issue is the fitness of the chosen analytical 
vehicle for undertaking critique and enabling emancipatory change. IT 
can apparently be made “critical” simply by equating an attentiveness to 
“grand challenges” with being critical. That is to evade what, for me, is the 
central question which is: how can the (conservative) pedigree of IT make 
it ‘well equipped’ to become critical in a form that is congruent with the 
ethico-political commitment of critical analysis to emancipatory change. 
































































8. Critical v. critical approaches. Professor Lok relies heavily upon a 
distinction between Critical and critical approaches. Critical approaches 
are held to refer to ‘the post-Marxist tradition including post-
structuralism’ whereas critical approaches are ‘aimed, possibly implicitly, 
at exposing, disrupting, or changing institutional arrangements in society 
for the betterment of humanity by engaging with issues of domination, 
oppression and/or inequality without necessarily following in the Critical 
tradition’. I have a number of difficulties with this distinction. First, I 
disagree with Professor Lok that the C/c distinction is ‘similar’ to the one 
that I deploy between traditional and critical theory.  I distinguish critical 
theory from traditional theory by its rejection of the assumption of 
separation between the subjects and objects of research and the 
subscription of traditional theory to “value free” science. Second, and 
relatedly, the C/c distinction is confusing as a common and perhaps 
defining thread of diverse forms of critical analysis is a commitment to 
the generation of scientific knowledge that is guided by an emancipatory 
intent, irrespective of whether it is “post-Marxist”, “post-structuralist” or 
whatever. Finally, and as a prickly aside, I note that Professor Lok 
ascribes the fantasy of  ‘wholeness’, or fullness, to what I have termed 
critical analysis, but he employs the unitary and totalizing notion of 
‘Critical’ to characterize such analysis. 
9. “Radical Constructivism”. I question the ascription of a ‘radically 
constructivist epistemology’ to my position (and, perhaps, to Critical 
theory). I do not subscribe to the understanding that ‘[W]hat we call 
reality(…) is wholly our construct’.  Yes, I am doubtful that our knowledge 
































































is likely to ‘reflect or represent what philosophers would call an 
“objective” reality ‘ because I believe all knowledge to be conditioned by, 
as well as constitutive of, the (particular and contested) interpretive 
frames deployed by communities of researchers when generating and 
evaluating their propositions, including their claims about ontology. 
However, that does not mean, or imply, that reality is equivalent, or 
reducible, to our accounts of it. To the contrary, the partiality of our 
accounts is recurrently dis-closed by the “constitutive lack” – the Real, in 
Lacanian terms - that unsettles or “queers” claims to objectivity – notably, 
by the (often unwelcome) recognition that scientific knowledge is, as 
Professor Lok puts it,  ‘politically constructed’. I therefor find it 
implausible to ascribe to me the view that ‘”Reality” may be real enough, 
but this is of little relevance to Critical analysis; the nature and effects of 
our knowledge construction about “it” is what is important’.  Nor, 
relatedly, do I consider analyses based upon a realist ontology or, for that 
matter, the uses of quantitative methods in research, to be necessarily 
“uncritical” or conservative.  As noted above (Point 2), I define critical 
analysis by reference to its emancipatory interest and effects, and not by 
its ontological or epistemological assumptions, whilst also recognizing 
that the existence of this interest is contested, and that its enactment can 
have contradictory consequences. I do believe, nonetheless, that ethico-
political commitments are key – because it is they, rather than Reality or 
Method, that inform and justify such assumptions about reality and 
knowledge. Critical analysis is self-consciousnly political in the sense that 
inter alia it advances and/or critiques the performative nature and effects 
































































of knowledge, including IT and critical analysis, in reporting and 
reproducing, or challenging and transforming, the status quo. Such critical 
analysis is exemplified by, but not limited to, the disruptive and 
transformative effects of, say, radical feminist thinking/activism.  
 
In conclusion, I fully concur with Professor Lok that my intervention/ 
provocation/ polemic has ‘fallen on deaf ears’, are at least has not prompted any 
noticeable response prior to Professor Lok’s extended commentary – perhaps 
because, politically, it is considered astute to deprive critical analysis of the 
“oxygene of publicity”. Muteness is also an adroit form of passive-aggressive 
non-affirmation.  Lack of engagement with the tradition of critical/emancipatory 
scholarship is perhaps the most eloquent indicator of disinterest in making IT 
critical, at least in a form that is recognizable as critical analysis. More charitably, 
the reticence to speak up may be symptomatic of the difficulty of realizing a 
latent, closeted interest by “coming out” as critical.  
 
So, on a more optimistic note, perhaps my intervention is a “slow burn”, with 
Professor Lok’s response facilitating some sustained reflection on the purpose of 
IT, fostering disenchantment with perpetuating a conservative form of analysis, 
and anticipating an embrace of emancipatory, radical change-oriented 
scholarship. Well, perhaps. 
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